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Price Fixing the Priceless?
Discouraging Collusion in the Secondary Art
Market
Nicole Dornbusch Horowitz
In the 1920s and 1930s, major oil companies took advantage of market conditions to
raise gasoline prices. They sold a limited amount of gasoline on smaller submarkets and
the remainder of their gasoline by other methods. Despite the fact that the submarkets
only represented a small portion of the overall gasoline market, pricing in the greater
market was based on them. Thus, through collusive agreements, major oil companies
were able to raise prices in the overall market by inflating prices in the smaller markets.
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that these
agreements constituted price-fixing and violated the Sherman Act.
Today, conditions in the art market create opportunities and incentives for coordinated
price manipulation similar to those present in Socony-Vacuum. Art sold at auction
represents a small portion of the art market, but prices paid for art at auction are used
to determine prices in the larger market. Further, the art market’s opacity and the fact
that small, tight-knit groups buy and sell high-end artworks provide even greater
opportunities for collusion than those present in Socony-Vacuum. This Note examines
these comparable opportunities and incentives through a study of activity in the market
for artworks by Andy Warhol.

 J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law; Senior Managing
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. Prior to attending law school, I worked as an arts administrator for Jose
Mugrabi, one of the collectors discussed in this Note. Many thanks to friends who provided feedback on
early drafts and to the Hastings Law Journal staff editors for their hard work in getting this Note to its
publishable state. In particular, I am grateful to my friend Jeremy Rhodes, my husband Adam Horowitz,
and Professors Christopher Ries and David Ward for their expertise and support, and for acting as
excellent sounding boards throughout the development of this Note.
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Introduction
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that major oil companies engaged in per se illegal price fixing
in violation of the Sherman Act by agreeing to purchase and store
gasoline sold on “spot markets.” The oil companies made those
agreements to restrict excess spot market supply and, as a result, increase
gasoline prices in the market generally. Although spot markets occupied
a small percentage of sales in the gasoline market, spot market supply
and pricing were used to determine overall contract pricing. By
restricting the spot market supply, the oil companies were able to create

1. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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the appearance of greater demand or decreased supply, which increased
prices for their own gasoline contracts.
Today, pricing for art functions in a similar manner to the pricing for
oil that occurred in Socony-Vacuum. Art sold at auction represents a
small portion of the art market, but prices paid for art at auction are used
to determine prices in the larger market. Moreover, data shows that, like
the oil companies in Socony-Vacuum, art dealers and invested collectors
of certain artists’ work frequently appear to be involved in the purchase
and sale, and hence the price determination, of those artists’ work at
auction. For example, with regard to the market for Andy Warhol’s
artworks, an analysis of publicly available data shows that, since 2005,
less than twenty parties have dominated bidding on Warhol works at
auction. Many of these bidders are either secondary art market dealers2
or collectors with large Warhol holdings who have an interest in ensuring
that Warhol works retain their high value. Currently, these dealers and
collectors have similar incentives and opportunities to collude and fix
Warhol prices through these auction “spot markets,” akin to the activity
that occurred in Socony-Vacuum.
Part I of this Note discusses market factors that make pricing in the
art market, and particularly in the secondary art market, subjectively
opaque and easy to manipulate. Part II compares the conditions in the
art market to the incentives and opportunities for collusion that led to
Socony-Vacuum. It also explains the characteristics that make the
Warhol market a good example of the broader secondary art market and
assesses auction records to determine bidding patterns in the Warhol
market. Part III proposes a solution that would discourage collusion and
offer greater market transparency, while preserving buyers and sellers’
much-desired privacy at auction.

I. The Art Market and Its Inflatable Investment Value
Many dealers, auction houses, collector-investors, and economists
view art as more than a durable commodity; they also view it as an
investment vehicle from which to derive gains.3 This vision of art as an
asset has led to immense growth in the art market, particularly with

2. “Secondary art market dealers” are those who deal in the secondary art market. The
secondary art market is the resale market for art, as compared to the primary market, where
“individual artists provide works to galleries, local art exhibitions, or directly to . . . consumers.” LouisAndré Gérard-Varet, On Pricing the Priceless: Comments on the Economics of the Visual Art
Market, 39 Eur. Econ. Rev. 508, 511 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Katya Kazakina, Billionaires at Basel Bet Art Is Better Investment Than Cash,
Bloomberg (July 19, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/billionaires-at-baselbet-art-better-investment-than-cash.html.
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respect to the most expensive artworks.4 As renowned modern art
collector Peggy Guggenheim reflected in her autobiography, “prices [for
art] were still normal” when she began collecting art after World War I.5
Then, in the 1950s “the whole picture world turned into an investment
market.”6 The change in pricing occurred because of the number of
speculators that entered the art market.
A number of factors related to the art market’s opacity create
opportunities and incentives for collusion between invested dealers and
collectors. First, art prices are inherently subjective because they are not
correlated with artworks’ intrinsic value; instead, they are primarily
based on buyers’ and sellers’ personal interests and trends in the market.7
Second, the art market is relatively unregulated, especially compared to
other markets where equivalent sums of money are exchanged, such as
the securities market.8 Third, the only sale prices made public are those
from auction records, such as those from Sotheby’s and Christie’s, which
only account for a high estimate of twenty percent of the total art market
in a given year.9 The remainder of sales occurs in private, with prices
only revealed to the parties to the transactions. Fourth, many auction
sales occur through “phone bids,” which may allow dealers or collectors
to manipulate prices without being identified. Finally, segments of the art
market are small and tight-knit, often guarding prices from the greater
public.
A. The Art Market’s Inherently Subjective Nature
The price of artwork is inherently subjective, as its value is primarily
based on market trends and buyers’ and sellers’ personal interests.10 This
characteristic makes art valuation different from that of other markets.11
Economists studying markets other than the art market look to

4. See Alexander Forbes, TEFAF Art Market Report Says 2013 Best Year on Record Since
With
Market
Outlook
Bullish,
Artnet
News
(Mar.
12,
2014),
http://news.artnet.com/market/tefaf-art-market-report-says-2013-best-year-on-record-since-2007-withmarket-outlook-bullish-5358.
5. Peggy Guggenheim, Out of this Century: Confessions of an Art Addict 108 (1979).
6. Id.
7. Researching Your Art: How Much Is Your Object Worth?, Smithsonian Inst.,
http://americanart.si.edu/research/tools/art/worth (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
8. Robin Pogrebin & Kevin Flynn, As Art Values Rise, So Do Concerns About Market’s
Oversight, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2013, at A1.
9. Rachel
Corbett,
How
Big
is
the
Global
Art
Market?,
Artnet,
http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/
news/artnetnews/china-the-worlds-top-art-and-antique-market.asp (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). This
figure may actually be generous. See infra Part I.C.
10. Researching Your Art: How Much Is Your Object Worth?, supra note 7.
11. William J. Baumol, Unnatural Value: Or Art Investment as Floating Crap Game, 76 Am.
Econ. Rev. 10, 10 (1986).

2007,
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commodities’ “normal,” “natural,” or “average” values.12 Those values
are the equilibrium prices towards which economic forces drive market
prices.13 On the other hand, art’s valuation is rarely correlated with its
natural value.14 Art prices are “strictly unnatural in the classical sense”
and have no equilibrium level driven by economic forces.15 They “float
more or less aimlessly,” and are directly determined by what buyers are
willing to pay.16
Given the absence of natural or intrinsic value in the art market,
prices must be set in a different way—based instead on market trends
and the personal interests of those buying and selling art.17 For example,
the highest known price paid for an artwork to date is $259 million, for
Paul Cézanne’s “The Card Players.”18 “The Card Players” is a painting;
its intrinsic value is the cost of canvas and oil paint.19 Forbes
hypothesized that the buyer, the country of Qatar, valued the painting at
such an exorbitant amount based on: Cezanne’s fame as an artist; the fact
that the artwork was rarely seen, remaining in private hands prior to the
sale; rumors that the work’s seller “turned down nine-figure offers to
buy” the work; and the fact that Qatar wanted a “treasure” to establish
itself as a “world-class intellectual mecca.”20 Accordingly, Qatar based its
purchase decision on factors other than the artwork’s natural or intrinsic
value.
As personal interests are subjective, buyers and sellers do not have
to explain why they are willing to buy or sell at higher prices. On a larger
scale, an investor that buys enough of a certain artist’s work can set
prices in that artist’s market to what she thinks they should be, without
explaining why those prices are appropriate.21 In this way, a heavily
invested dealer determines for how much she is willing to buy or sell a
work, and through enough of these decisions, sets market trends. Thus,
the current market structure creates the opportunity to affect both of the
bases for price determination—personal tastes and market trends—
without explanation.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Researching Your Art: How Much Is Your Object Worth?, supra note 7.
Alexandra Peers, Qatar Purchases Cézanne’s The Card Players for More Than $250 Million,
Highest Price Ever for a Work of Art, Vanity Fair (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/
2012/02/qatar-buys-cezanne-card-players-201202.
19. Jane Lee, Cézanne’s Card Players Shatters Record for Highest Price Ever for a Work of Art,
Forbes (Feb. 6, 2012, 1:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janelee/2012/02/06/cezannes-card-playersshatters-record-for-highest-price-ever-for-a-work-of-art.
20. Id.
21. Baumol, supra note 11, at 10.
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B. Lack of Regulation in the Art Market
In addition to the fact that art has no natural value, lack of
regulation in the art market creates further opportunities for price
manipulation.22 By 1991, Alice Goldfarb Marquis compared the art
auction market to the stock market, stating that given the “large sums of
money . . . at stake” in both markets, “creative minds scheme to
manipulate the system.”23 However, she identified a difference between
the markets, stating, “there is no Securities and Exchange Commission to
formulate and enforce rules.”24
For example, in many cases, the seller is the buyer’s advisor.25 Thus,
the buyer’s main sources for determining the value of the piece of art are
the public auction market and the seller-advisor.26 The Economist
referenced this lack of regulation in an article about “Carte Blanche,” a
sale at auction house Phillips, curated by art dealer and consultant
Philippe Ségalot.27 According to the article, Ségalot both “persuaded
sellers to consign” and “advised buyers” in that sale.28 According to The
Economist, Ségalot was seen bidding against his assistant Ali Rosenbaum
and his business partner Franck Giraud, each representing different
collectors.29 When asked whether acting on behalf of buyers and sellers
constituted a conflict of interest, Ségalot “insisted it was not a
problem.”30
Despite Ségalot’s dismissal of the possibility of a conflict of interest,
this structure appears to lead to an inherent one. Undoubtedly, a seller
or a dealer representing a seller has an interest in selling the work at its
highest price.31 An advisor, on the other hand, should help a buyer
purchase a work at a fair price.32 Since the buyer is depending on the

22. Pogrebin & Flynn, supra note 8.
23. Alice G. Marquis, The Art Biz: The Covert World of Collectors, Dealers, Auction
Houses, Museums, and Critics 255 (1991).
24. Id.
25. Artelligence Panel: Inside the Modern Market, Art Mkt. Monitor (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/ 2012/08/22/artelligence-recap-inside-the-modern-market.
26. Georgina Adam, Inside the World of the Art Adviser, Art Newspaper (June 12, 2009),
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Inside-the-world-of-the-art-adviser/17486.
27. Sarah Thornton, A Passion that Knows No Bounds, Economist (Nov. 19, 2010, 5:39 PM),
http://www.economist.com/node/17551930.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Katya Kazakina, Perelman’s ‘Popeye’ Spurs Accusations of Secret Deals at Gallery,
Bloomberg (Sept. 16, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-17/perelman-spopeye-spurs-accusations-of-secret-deals-at-gallery.html (detailing the potential conflict of interest
leading to several lawsuits between dealer Larry Gagosian and billionaire buyer Ron Perelman).
32. Eric Bryant, 10 Things to Know About Choosing an Art Adviser, Blouin Artinfo (July 10,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/967954/10-things-to-know-about-choosingan-art-adviser.
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seller-advisor to recommend the work’s appropriate price, the seller has
an immense opportunity to adjust those prices to her advantage.
This conflict was highlighted in 1989, when Sylvester Stallone sued
his art consultant, Barbara Guggenheim.33 Stallone claimed that, after he
bought an artwork on Guggenheim’s advice, he discovered the seller was
a private dealer and friend of hers.34 While Stallone purchased the work
for $1.7 million in accordance with Guggenheim’s alleged advice, he also
learned that a work by that artist had never sold for more than $1
million.35 In the suit, Stallone questioned Guggenheim’s ability to
represent his interests as an advisee as well of those of her friend and
colleague, the work’s seller.
C. The Importance of Auctions To Art Market Valuation
Further opportunities for price manipulation exist because sales at
only a few auction houses—particularly Sotheby’s and Christie’s—
provide the primary reference for the value of other artworks.36 Art
valuation indices, such as the Mei Moses index, base their studies only on
works sold at auction.37 Similarly, auction houses and dealers rely on past
auction catalogues and websites that post auction records, such as
Artnet, when determining prices for comparable works to be sold.38 Even
“museums rely on [auction records] for insurance valuations and dealers
adjust their prices to conform with the latest sales figures.”39
News sources make auction records appear even more important, as
they regularly report on “evening sales” for Impressionist/Modern Art
and Contemporary Art during the major auctions in New York and
London.40 Sotheby’s and Christie’s sell their most notable, and generally
most expensive, artworks in these two genres at these separate one-night
sales four times per year—twice in London, in October and June, and
twice in New York, in November and May.41 The general public learns

33. Stallone Files $5-Million Suit Against N.Y. Art Consultant, L.A. Times, Dec. 27, 1989, at 8.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, Art Auctions: A Survey of Empirical Studies 3
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8997, 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8997. For more information on the logistics of art auctions, see id. at 5–7.
37. See, e.g., Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, Computation and Data Collection of the Mei Moses
Family of Art Indexes, http://www.artasanasset.com/main/computation.php (last visited Dec. 14, 2014)
(“To insure transparency for our art indexes we only collect data based on public auction results.”).
38. Eric J. Russ, Is Andy Warhol Dangerous?: Why the Pop Art Superstar May Be a Risky
Investment at Present Market Valuation 20 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Sotheby’s Institute
of Art) (on file with author).
39. Marquis, supra note 23, at 255.
40. See, e.g., Christie’s News, N.Y. Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
organizations/c/christies/index.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); Marquis, supra note 23, at 250.
41. See, e.g., Impressionist & Modern Art, Christies, http://www.christies.com/departments/
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about art prices through these sources, given the relative opacity of the
rest of the market. For the general public, these works represent the
greater art market.
The focus on auctions leads to opportunities for collusion. An
inevitable selection bias for market prices exists when prices are drawn
only from auction records.42 Only a small percentage of total sales occur
at auction. Though no consensus exists as to the percentage of the total
market that sales at Sotheby’s and Christie’s auctions occupy, a high
estimate in 2012 was twenty percent.43 Generally, works throughout the
art market that decrease in value or are not in demand do not go to
auction.44 Instead, owners sell the work privately or hold on to it until the
market for that artwork recovers.45 Additionally, sales of art at auction
occur infrequently, with the average turnover for an individual artwork
at around thirty years.46 This infrequency makes it even harder to
determine the average change in prices for the artwork.
As indices and sellers rely on past auction sales to determine future
prices, they disregard a majority of the market. In fact, the Financial
Times has quoted Kevin Radell, Artnet’s market research specialist,
referring to art market indices as “alchemy,” because of the inherent
misconceptions they fuel.47 The fact that this portion of the market is so
important to price determination provides greater opportunities for price
manipulation; a collector can affect an entire artist’s market by driving
up auction prices for artworks by that artist. Despite their shortcomings,
these auction records are vital to determining market conditions because
they are the only part of the market that is public and transparent.48

impressionist-and-modern-art-29-1.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); Contemporary Art, Christies,
http://www.christies.com/departments/post-war-and-contemporary-art-74-1.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
42. Ashenfelter & Graddy, supra note 36, at 14.
43. See Clare McAndrew, European Fine Art Found., The International Art Market in
2011: Observations on the Art Trade over 25 Years 30 (2012) [hereinafter TEFAF Report]. Many
dealers decline to participate in studies of the art market’s size. Corbett, supra note 9. Thus, it is
impossible to truly know how much art is traded privately, and the percentage of art sold at auction is
likely to be even smaller. Id.
44. Ashenfelter & Graddy, supra note 36, at 14.
45. Tom Johansmeyer, The Global Art Market Finds Its Floor, DailyFinance (Oct. 26, 2009,
12:30 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/10/26/the-global-art-market-finds-its-floor.
46. TEFAF Report, supra note 43, at 94.
47. Deborah Brewster, Buying Paintings by Numbers, Financial Times (Aug. 11, 2006, 4:19 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3c6d52fe-2882-11db-a2c1-0000779e2340.html (quoting Kevin Radell of
Artnet.com) (“To pretend average price indices are the same as price/performance indices is alchemy.
They are measuring different paintings, so they are meaningless from a financial point of view.”).
48. See Felix Salmon, Are Warhol Auctions Being Gamed?, Reuters, May 24, 2011, available at
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/05/24/are-warhol-auctions-being-gamed (stating that auction
prices’ main value is their very public indication of how much someone is willing to pay for a certain
artwork); see also Mei & Moses, supra note 37.
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D. Phone Bidders at Auction
Phone bidding adds another level of secrecy to the auction process.
Auction statistics show that many buyers at auction cannot be identified
because they bid by phone through an auction house employee.49 Phone
bidding became popular by the 1980s, at which time up to ten auction
“staff members [might be] lined up at the front of the main gallery taking
bids by telephone” for an artwork.50 Today, at a single evening auction,
there may be as many as seventy staff members on telephones in a sales
room, reporting artworks’ current statuses to clients.51 Typically the
employee calls the client before bidding on the artwork begins.52 She
then reports the artwork’s status and bids on behalf of the client when
instructed to do so.53 Accordingly, the client can bid as though she is in
the room without being identified by other buyers, the press, or the
public.54
While some phone bidders may be as far away from the auction as
another country, others are may be in the actual auction room, using the
process to guard their identities.55 In fact, Town and Country magazine
quotes Brett Gorvy, Christie’s Chairman and International Head of
Postwar and Contemporary Art, explaining that sometimes he and other
employees are simply pretending to be on the phone, and instead
“looking out into the room to someone who [is] giving [them] a preagreed symbol.”56 This anonymity allows bidders to affect auction prices,
and potentially manipulate the art market, without being identified.
Despite the secrecy of phone bids and the opportunities that they
create for manipulation, these sales can be an important measure of art’s
value. Record-breaking sales often occur by phone.57 Town and Country
also quotes Gorvy as stating, “It all happens on the phone . . . if you look
at the [most expensive works], eight of 10 times they go to phone bids.”58
Thus, phone bidding is an essential part of the auction market.

49. See infra Figure 1.
50. Rita Reif, Auctions: Phone Bids Add to Drama, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1984, at C27.
51. See, e.g., Daniel Grant, The Pleasures and Perils of Auction-House Phone Bids, ARTnews
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.artnews.com/2013/10/16/pleasures-and-perils-of-phone-bids-at-auctions.
52. See, e.g., Sotheby’s, Absentee/Telephone Bidding Form: Jony and Marc’s (Red) Auction
(Nov. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sothebys.com/content/dam/sothebys/PDFs/cob/N09014AbsenteeBid.pdf (stating, in its standard guide for telephone bids, that someone “will call [the bidder]
from the saleroom shortly before [the] lot is offered”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Rachel Wolff, The Essential Guide to Auctions, Town & Country, Aug. 2011, at 64, 69.
56. Id.
57. Sarah Thornton, The Wizards of the Warhol Market, Economist (May 17, 2011, 4:02 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/05/contemporary_art_sales.
58. Wolff, supra note 55, at 69.
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E. The Secondary Art Market
Opportunities for collusion and price manipulation are particularly
present on the secondary art market. The secondary art market is the
resale market for art, as compared to the primary market, where
“individual artists provide works to galleries, local art exhibitions, or
directly to . . . consumers.”59 Known as a “dealer market,” the secondary
market is composed of a range of resale market segments for works by
notable artists.60 Each segment hosts a small network of top dealers and
auction houses that are crucial to that segment’s success.61 These
networks are especially important at the most expensive end of the
secondary market, occupied by a small group of international auction
houses and dealers mostly trading blue-chip art in New York and
London.62 These groups are often privy to “informational asymmetries”
because they are the only ones who know the value of artworks traded
privately.63
Information asymmetries are especially prominent because only
certain wealthy parties can afford to be involved in these sales. As Sarah
Thornton explains in her book on the art market, “the thing that most
distinguishes [secondary-market dealers] from primary dealers is their
need to be ‘cashed up’” to be effective.64 Thornton clarifies that these
parties, “the strongest players” in the secondary market, “have the
capital to buy with no financial pressure to sell.”65 Of course, only a
limited number of people are in that position.66 As those people are
particularly aware of the conditions present in an artist’s market, while
others are not, the secondary market is even more opaque for most art
buyers than the primary market. This additional layer of opacity leads to
further opportunities for market manipulation.

59. Gérard-Varet, supra note 2, at 511.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (explaining that economists call these practices “informational asymmetries” because one
party to a trade can profit by using information to which others do not have access).
64. Sarah Thornton, Seven Days in the Art World 30 (2008).
65. Id.
66. Mike Boehm, Report: Super-Rich, Favoring Just a Few Artists, Drive Art Market, L.A. Times
(Mar. 18, 2014, 7:34 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-art-marketprices-auctions-billionalires-20140316-story.html (“When we’re talking about the people who really,
really matter in the art market, the [2014 TEFAF Art Market Report] informs us, we’re talking not
about those 600,000 mere millionaires and their tastes, but about just under 200,000 ‘ultra-high net
worth individuals’ (UHNWIs) who sit atop piles of $30 million or more”).
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II. Opportunities and Incentives for Collusion: Comparing
SOCONY-VACUUM to the Current Art Market
The art market conditions just described are similar to those that
created the opportunities and incentives for the formation of a gasoline
cartel in the early twentieth century, culminating in the U.S. Supreme
Court case United States v. Socony-Vacuum.67 Accordingly, the current
art market structure creates the same incentives and opportunities for a
similar “spot market” price fixing plan.68 In fact, the subjective value,
lack of regulation, and opaque nature of the market, in combination,
create even greater opportunities for collusive price fixing than those
that led to Socony-Vacuum.
A. Market Conditions Leading to SOCONY-VACUUM
In the 1920s and 1930s, crude oil refiners sold gasoline either on spot
markets or by long-term contracts.69 On spot markets, shipments were
“made in the immediate future—usually within ten to fifteen days.”70 No
central exchange existed for spot market transactions; instead, sales
resulted from “individual bargaining between” refiners and middlemen
or wholesalers, with their prices published daily in trade journals.71 For
long-term contracts, the buyer agreed to take delivery and the seller
agreed to provide a fixed amount of gasoline up to a year in advance.72
Long-term contracts during the period “contained price formulae that
were directly dependent on” spot market prices.73 Thus, contract pricing
was tied to spot pricing.74
At that time, a number of factors—including the fact that oil wells in
the Midwest and Texas began overproducing crude oil—deflated oil and
gasoline prices.75 Closing the over-producing wells was difficult and
costly.76 Smaller producers and refiners had little storage capacity,
forcing them to sell their crude oil and gasoline quickly on spot
67. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
68. For an explanation of “spot market,” see Spot Price Definition, Nasdaq,
http://www.nasdaq.com/
investing/glossary/s/spot-price (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (defining spot markets as those “in which
goods are sold for cash and delivered immediately”); see also Definitions, Sources, and Explanatory
Notes, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/tbldefs/pet_pri_spt_tbldef2.asp (last
visited Dec. 14, 2014) (defining spot price as “[t]he price for a one-time open market transaction for
immediate delivery of a specific quantity of product at a specific location where the commodity is
purchased ‘on the spot’ at current market rates”).
69. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 193.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 193–94.
72. Id. at 192.
73. Id. at 198.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 170.
76. Id.
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markets.77 These hurried sales drove down both the spot market and,
because of their public nature and direct effect on the market, the longerterm contract prices that made up the majority of the market.78 Affected
states and the federal government instituted laws to regulate pricing but
they were largely ineffective.79
Meanwhile, major oil companies were heavily invested in the
gasoline market.80 They engaged in “every branch of the business—
owning and operating oil wells, pipe-lines, refineries, bulk storage plants,
and service stations.”81 Given their investment, they had an incentive to
keep prices for gasoline high. When the U.S. Secretary of the Interior
established a Petroleum Administrative Board to determine ways to
improve the market, many of these major oil companies became
involved.82 In 1934, the Petroleum Administrative Board formed a
General Stabilization Committee, a voluntary, cooperative movement to
correct the market.83 In 1935, the General Stabilization Committee met
and established a Tank Car Committee (“Committee”).84 The major oil
companies, parties to that Committee, subsequently created a conspiracy
plan to fix prices.85
Beyond the fact that their heavy investment created an incentive to
manipulate the market, the market structure, through which spot prices
influenced contract prices, created opportunities for collusive price
manipulation. Despite spot sales’ importance to price determination,
they only accounted for about five percent of total gasoline marketed in
a corresponding area,86 with more common long-term oil-purchase
contracts constituting the rest of the market.87 Since prices in the overall
market were determined based on spot market prices, oil companies
could raise spot market prices to create the illusion of decreased supply
or heightened demand, and raise contract prices in the overall market.
Major Midwestern and Texan oil companies seized the opportunity to
manipulate prices through these spot markets in the late 1920s, thereby
securing their investments.88

77. Id. at 171; see C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas,
56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 895, 909 (2008).
78. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 171; see also Rogers, supra note 77, at 909.
79. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 170–71.
80. Id. at 164, 173, 179, 184 (calling those involved the “major companies”).
81. Id. at 166 n.4.
82. Id. at 171–72.
83. Id. at 175–77.
84. Id. at 178.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 170.
87. Id. at 192–93.
88. Id. at 169.
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These companies, having sufficient space to store the gasoline that
smaller independent refiners overproduced, were assigned respective
independent refiners or “dancing partners” from whom they would buy
surplus gasoline.89 Thus, the independent refiners no longer needed to
immediately sell their overproduced gasoline at exceedingly low prices
and instead, could sell to their assigned major oil companies.90 The major
oil companies could hold onto the excess gasoline until market
conditions stabilized and then sell limited quantities of it to meet
demand. The conspiracy succeeded; as oil companies acted according to
the plan, the spot market prices for gasoline rose. Since overall gasoline
prices were based on spot market prices, these buying plans “at least
contributed to the price rise and the stability . . . of gasoline” during the
period.91
B. The Sherman Act and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Evaluation of

SOCONY-VACUUM
In Socony-Vacuum, the Supreme Court held that the major oil

companies’ conspiracy plan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1, commonly known as
the Sherman Act (the “Act”). Congress passed the Act as “the basic
statute of the anti-trust laws” in 1890.92 Among other antitrust activity,
the Act prevents price fixing. Section 1 of the Act states that “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”93
Since the Act’s inception, the Supreme Court has “consistently and
without deviation” read § 1 to mean that price fixing agreements are per
se unlawful.94 Accordingly, § 1 does not require a competitive abuse
showing;95 as the Court explained in United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc.:
It makes no difference whether the motives of the participants are
good or evil; whether the price fixing is accomplished by express
contract or by some more subtle means; whether the participants
possess market control; whether the amount of interstate commerce
affected is large or small; or whether the effect of the agreement is to
raise or to decrease prices.96

89. Id. at 179.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 219.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014); Austin T. Stickells, Federal Control of Business: Antitrust Laws
§ 28 (1972).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
94. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218.
95. Id.
96. 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956).
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All that must be proved in a § 1 price fixing prosecution is the existence
of an agreement to fix prices.97 Further, a price fixing agreement need
not come in the form of one single “moment of [the conspiracy’s]
crystallization,” as long as the existence of a concerted effort is
established.98
Based on those principles, the Socony-Vaccum Court held that the
agreement to manipulate gasoline prices on “spot markets” was a per se
§ 1 violation.99 The Court called other factors leading to the rise and
stability of the market “immaterial” to the Court’s determination.100 It
explained that the “reasonableness” of the prices or “good intentions” of
the participants were irrelevant, as the Act’s main goal is to promote a
free-market system, and,
[i]f the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the
reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every
price fixing case. In that event the Sherman Act would soon be
emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted by one which is
wholly alien to a system of free competition. 101

Moreover, the Court stated that the agreement violated the Act despite
the fact that prices were not rigid. Price fixing is not just the
establishment of uniform prices, it is any “interference with the setting of
prices by free market forces.”102
Socony-Vacuum was also significant because no single formal
contract existed between the oil companies to substantiate the
conspiracy.103 Instead, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) built its case
against the oil companies around proof of meetings at which the
conspiracy’s details were decided.104 In essence, the agreement that
denoted the § 1 violation came in the form of an informal “gentlemen’s
agreement” or “understanding whereby each [defendant] undertook to
perform” its role in the conspiracy.105 In fact, within one year of the first
meeting, the plan worked well enough that in-person meetings were no
longer necessary, any relevant discussions were held by phone.106

97. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218.
98. Id. at 188; see also Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Traditional ‘hardcore’ price fixing remains per se unlawful under the seminal case United States v. Socony-Vacuum . . . .”).
99. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218.
100. Id. at 219.
101. Id. at 221.
102. 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 69 (2013).
103. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 188 (“It is impossible to find from the record the exact point of
crystallization of a buying program.”).
104. Id. at 178.
105. Id. at 179.
106. Id. at 185.

Horowitz_13 (Teixeira corrected).doc (Do Not Delete)

December 2014]

11/26/2014 2:18 PM

PRICE FIXING THE PRICELESS?

345

C. Conditions in the Current Art Market and SOCONY-VACUUM:
Similar Incentives and Opportunities for Collusion
Parallels exist between the conditions in the gasoline market in

Socony-Vacuum and those in the current secondary art market. A small

group of major oil companies were involved in the formation of the
Socony-Vacuum conspiracy. Likewise, a small group of art dealers and
collectors can dominate a certain artist’s market. These parties’
significant investments in their respective markets create incentives for
collusive price fixing to sustain or raise the value of their portfolios.
Both markets reflect certain characteristics that lead to
opportunities for price fixing. First, in Socony-Vacuum, published spot
sales occupied a small portion of the market, but set overall prices. In the
secondary art market, while auction sales constitute a small portion of
the market, they too influence overall prices. Second, in both markets,
spot sales and auction sales are public, while other sales are not. The
remainders of the corresponding markets are more opaque than the spot
and auction portions of the markets. These two factors, in combination,
create opportunities to manipulate spot and auction markets, while
affecting prices in the larger markets. Third, the limited number of
parties involved in the art market creates incentives to collude, as cartels
are more streamlined, stable, and efficient when they have fewer
members.107
Further, even more opportunities for price fixing are present in the
art market than were present in the conspiracy leading to SoconyVacuum. Three other aspects of the art market not present in SoconyVacuum make the art market more opaque and ripe for collusive price
fixing: the subjective value of art; the conflicts of interest present when
dealer/sellers double as advisors; and phone bidding, which allows parties
to bid while remaining anonymous. As discussed earlier in this Note,
these factors create opportunities for interested parties to manipulate the
market while remaining unidentified.108
A study of the current market for Andy Warhol’s artwork
demonstrates the likelihood that these opportunities and incentives exist
and serves as an example for the rest of the secondary market. This Note
will assess statistics in the Warhol market only since this area of the
market provides an example for similar opportunities and incentives that
may exist in other segments of the secondary market.

107. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 515, 564 (2004).
108. See supra Part I.
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Warhol: The “One-Man Dow Jones”

The Warhol market is often considered a determinant of the greater
secondary art market. In fact, The Economist has referred to the Warhol
market as the art market’s bellwether or “one-man Dow Jones.”109 The
Warhol auction market has continued to grow in the last few years.110 In
2010, 148 works at auction alone sold for a total of $277 million and
accounted for seventeen percent of all post-war and contemporary
auction sales.111 During the 2011 auctions, Warhol works sold for a total
of $300 million.112 In fact, at each of the three major auction houses’
spring evening sales that year, the most expensive lot was created by
Warhol.113
Another factor that makes Warhol a good measure of the overall art
market is, as The Economist explains, the group that collects Warhol’s
art “often find[s] [itself] coming together around other artists;” the same
group of collectors that buy Warhol’s works invest in works by other
artists.114 For instance, Jose Mugrabi, Peter Brant, Steve Cohen, and
Larry Gagosian, four avid Warhol collectors, all have some connection to
artist Urs Fischer, whose artwork Christie’s offered for sale in 2011.115

2.

Incentives and Opportunities for Collusion Created by TightKnit Market

Given the importance of Warhol works to the remainder of the art
market, I use a study of available Warhol auction records to show the
incentives and opportunities for collusion that the current art market
fosters. Dealers and collectors with the largest and most valuable Warhol
holdings have an incentive to keep Warhol auction prices high. Having a
substantial market share correlates to the risk of a significant decline in a

109. See Bryan Appleyard, A One-Man Market, Intelligent Life (Nov./Dec. 2011), available at
http://moreintelligentlife.com/content/arts/a-one-man-market; Russ, supra note 38, at 6; Sarah
Thornton, The Pop Master’s Highs and Lows, Economist, Nov. 28, 2009, at 9, 9.
110. ArtTactic, Andy Warhol Market: September 2012 2 (2012). “During the 1980s art market
boom, Warhol’s total auction sales were only $2.3 million (1980–1987). However, his market showed
signs of improvement beginning in 1986 and expanded rapidly after Warhol’s death in 1987 reaching
$31.3 million in 1989.” Id. His market yo-yoed with the stock and commodities market between 1987
and 1998. Id. As of 1998, “the market entered a new growth phase.” Id. In 1999, the Warhol market
was valued at $22.5 million, and by 2007 it was valued at $382.4 million. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Thornton, supra note 57. Those works were: “Self-Portrait,” 1963–64 (Christie’s, $38.4
million); “Liz #5 (Early Colored Liz),” 1963 (Phillips, $24 million); and “Sixteen Jackies,” 1964
(Sotheby’s, $20 million). Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Christie’s offered “Untitled (Lamp/Bear)” by Urs Fischer for sale in 2011. Id. Brant and
Cohen both collect works by the artist, and the work is “soon to be shown at Gagosian’s Beverly Hills
gallery.” Id. “Consigned by the Mugrabis, the work sold for $6.8m, an astounding price for art by a 38year-old, especially for a 17-tonne sculpture in need of electrification.” Id.
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collection’s value, or worse, the collector’s portfolio, if comparable
artworks’ values lessen. While not all artworks are alike, many blue-chip
artworks are comparable to those sold at auction. For example, the
Warhol market provides extraordinary opportunities for collusion
because Warhol created works in series. A series is a group of artworks
that are similar, but exhibit slight differences. One such series by Warhol
is titled “Flowers.”116 In its online sold lot archive, Sotheby’s indicates
that it has sold a total of 126 Warhol lots from that series since 2004.117
Given the number of similar artworks, those determining prices have
numerous reference points against which to compare a painting in the
series.118
In a 2011 panel on the art market, Hillel “Helly” Nahmad, son of
billionaire art dealer David Nahmad, explained the incentive to influence
prices through the auction market, stating that, if he owns “ten examples
of an artist[‘s work valued at $1 million each], and an eleventh example
comes up for auction . . . and [he] allow[s that work to trade for]
$700,000, then theoretically . . . [his] ten other comparable paintings are
all worth $700,000.”119
In other words, the value of Nahmad’s comparable investments is
affected by that public sale. Certain art dealers and collectors are
significantly invested in particular artists’ markets. For example, Jose
Mugrabi owns an estimated 800 Warhols.120 Business Insider

116. Floral Fantasy, Sotheby’s http://www.sothebys.com/en/news-video/videos/2013/10/FloralFantasy.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
117. Search Results for Sold Lot Archive, Sotheby’s http://www.sothebys.com/en/search.html?ex_
creator=warhol&ex_title=flowers&ex_currency=USD&startDate=01%
2F01%
2F2004&endDate=21%
2F07
%
2F2014&ex_soldPR=soldPR#keywords= (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). This number may include works
that have been sold more than once. Id.
118. Id.
119. Artelligence Panel, supra note 25; see also Patricia Hurtado & Katya Kazakina, Art Dealer
Nahmad Gets 1-Year Term in Gambling Case, Bloomberg (May 1, 2014, 3:36 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-30/art-dealer-nahmad-gets-1-year-term-in-gamblingcase.html. Nahmad and his family primarily deal in work by Pablo Picasso, Mark Rothko, and Francis
Bacon. Wolff, supra note 55, at 64. They also deal in Warhol. Helly Nahmad Gallery,
http://www.hellynahmadgallery.com/artists (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); see also William D. Grampp,
Pricing the Priceless: Art, Artists, and Economics 142 (1989) (“[Uncertain in the art market] is
whether an actual sale at an actual price was made in order to inflate the value of a work. A owns one
or more paintings by Z and at an auction bids for another that has been put up for sale by another
owner or by A himself. A increases his bid as much as the rules of the auction permit. If his is the
winning bid it establishes a new and higher value for the works of Z including those which A owns. If
his is not the winning bid, the value of his collection rises even more . . . . Consistent with the account
is the fact that auction houses frequently do not reveal the names of buyers and sellers . . . [or that]
certain conditions [would also] be present[, such as] the spurious bidder has confederates who bid.”).
120. Kelly Crow, The Man with the 800 Warhols, Wall St. J. (Jan. 4, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB119940749725466431. Fellow dealer Francis Naumann, speaking
with the New York Times Magazine, called Mugrabi and his sons “so invested [in the Warhol market],
they’re like the casino, not the gambler.” Eric Konigsberg, Is Anybody Buying Art these Days?, N.Y.
Times Mag., Mar. 1, 2009, at 22, 24.
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approximates that those Warhols account for an estimated $770 million
of his $795 million in assets.121 Thus, as an investor heavily invested in a
market, he may have an incentive to protect his Warhol investment by
affecting the market through auctions. The Socony-Vacuum defendants
had similarly large investments in the gasoline market, and thus, had a
similar incentive to fix prices.
Nahmad’s statements during that 2011 panel also demonstrate the
opportunities to influence prices through the auction market.122 With
regard to his practices, Nahmad explained that if he owns ten artworks,
previously valued at $1 million, and a similar work comes up for auction
at a price that he finds “to be very low,” such as $700,000, he is “forced to
bid on” the work and either acquire it “at a good value . . . or stop
bidding at one million dollars,” letting someone else buy it for the price
of the work he already owns.123 In the case of heated bidding, if a
comparable sells for “$1.1 million or $1.2 million[,] [his] other ten works
[would be] worth $1.1 million or $1.2 million.”124 In contrast, if he does
not bid, he allows the value of the piece he already owns to be marked at
the new, and lower, market value established at that auction. Thus, these
auctions create opportunities to maintain and raise the values of the
artworks he already owns. Here, as in Socony-Vacuum, a market player
has the opportunity to protect the value of his overall investment by
publicly buying a substantially similar asset to those he owns in his
portfolio at constant or elevated rates.
In addition, as in the conspiracy that led to Socony-Vacuum, the
small, tight-knit nature of the Warhol market creates further
opportunities for collusion. Not all Warhol buyers and underbidders are
identified at auction, but a study of those who are may indicate the
probability that auctions give dealers and collectors the opportunity to
collude.
The following collection of data focuses on evening auctions at
Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips. I have chosen this subset of auction
records because these three auction houses are the most publicized. To
compile this information, I evaluated Baer Faxt newsletters from 2005 to
2013. Art market critic Josh Baer publishes these newsletters, including
his personal notes on buyers and underbidders at auction.125 I then
checked that data against various news sources, when possible, such as
The New York Times, Blouin Artnet, Bloomberg News, and The Wall

121. Julie Zeveloff, Meet the World’s Biggest Warhol Collector, Who Just Added a $37 Million
Work to His Trove, Business Insider (May 10, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/jostmugrabi-warhol-collector-2012-5.
122. Artelligence Panel, supra note 25.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. About The Baer Faxt, The Baer Faxt, http://www.baerfaxt.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
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Street Journal, published around the time of each relevant sale. While

this study does not include all sale records, it is based on the only public
information on buyers and underbidders available. I created two figures
using this data, one that displays percentages of works purchased by
parties at auction (“Documented Warhol Buyers”) (Figure 1), and
another that displays percentages of works on which parties bid without
making the final, winning bid, (“Documented Warhol Underbidders”) in
cases where the work was purchased within or above its estimated value
range (Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Documented Warhol Buyers at
Evening Auctions, 2005–2013

A group of twelve collectors and dealers appear consistently on the
list of Documented Warhol Buyers identified between 2005 and 2013,
accounting for about half of known purchases. Eight of these twelve
parties are professionals who either deal in Warhol works or own or
represent galleries that sell them.126 Artinfo, a publication on the art
market, reports that Stavros Merjos, one of the four “non-professionals,”
is an avid art collector and is married to an art dealer who sells Warhol
works at her gallery.127 Another twenty percent of purchases occurred by
phone, so it is difficult to know whether more of the same art dealers or
other collectors made those purchases.128

126. See supra Figure 1.
127. The Love List: Power Couples of the Art World, Blouin Artinfo (Feb. 15, 2011, 8:19 AM),
http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/123097/the-love-list-power-couples-of-the-art-world (listing
Merjos as married to art dealer Honor Fraser); see also Honor Fraser, http://www.honorfraser. com
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (listing current and past Warhol exhibitions at the gallery).
128. See supra Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Documented Warhol Underbidders at
Evening Auctions, 2005–2013

An even smaller group of collectors and dealers, only ten
individuals, account for about seventy percent of Documented Warhol
Underbidders on works sold above or within their estimated value during
that period. Underbidding is particularly appealing for someone hoping
to sustain an artist’s market. As Nahmad has explained, one can push up
or sustain the value of comparable artworks without spending any
money.129 The Nahmad family’s activity in the Warhol market indicates
that the family may use this method of affecting prices; the available data
shows that Nahmad’s family underbid four percent of the time, while it
never, at least publicly, appeared as a buyer.
Nine out of the ten Documented Warhol Underbidders are art
dealers. The tenth is collector Aby Rosen, who may soon be neighbors
with art dealer Alberto Mugrabi, Jose Mugrabi’s son and business
partner. After Rosen showed Mugrabi the building where he had
recently gone into contract to buy a condominium, Mugrabi decided to
buy a condominium there as well.130 Jose Mugrabi and his two sons
Alberto and David rent their collection’s primary office and gallery space
from Rosen, and they have collaborated with him to present art
exhibitions in the lobby of the office building.131
129. Artelligence Panel, supra note 25.
130. Alyssa Abkowitz, Two Big Art Collectors Pick Up Condos, Wall St. J. (Sept. 21, 2013),
http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-280902/?mod=wsj_streaming
_latest-headlines; Mark Maurer, Aby Rosen, Alberto Mugrabi Buy at Schumacher, The Real Deal (July 19,
2013, 11:30 AM), http://therealdeal.com/blog/2013/07/19/aby-rosen-alberto-mugrabi-buy-at-schumacher.
131. Marion Maneker, Aby Rosen Gets Self & Mugrabi into New Digs, Art Mkt. Monitor
(July 19, 2013), http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/2013/07/19/aby-rosen-gets-self-mugrabi-into-new-
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The Mugrabi family and Rosen do not represent an anomaly in this
group of parties invested in the Warhol market; many of the recurring
parties appear to know each other, collaborate in business, and socialize
together.132 In one example, the U.S. government sued collector Peter
Brant and dealer Larry Gagosian for tax evasion for a previous joint
venture.133 Further, these parties do not keep their bidding practices
secret from one another or from the public. Helly Nahmad and Alberto
Mugrabi have essentially laid them out in the media.134 The tight-knit
nature of the group creates opportunities for “gentlemen’s agreements”
similar to the one in Socony-Vacuum.
In addition to the tight-knit nature of the parties, phone bidding
provides another opportunity for a dealer to influence the value of an
artist’s works while remaining anonymous. Warhol auction statistics
reflect this commonality. Over twenty-percent of Warhol works sold at
evening auctions are purchased by phone.135 According to Christie’s
Chairman and International Head of Postwar and Contemporary Art,
Brett Gorvy, that statistic is low compared to that of the most expensive
works. He explained that eight out of ten of the most expensive artworks
“go to phone bids.”136
According to the study underlying Figure 1, twelve dealers and
collectors with another group of unidentified phone bidders purchase
seventy-five percent of Warhol works. Given those figures, by
collaborating to buy or underbid works, invested parties within this

digs; Midtown Madness, W Mag., Nov. 2007, at 98, available at http://www.wmagazine.com/culture/artand-design/2007/11/uncensored_lever.
132. For example, according to New York Magazine, before opening his own gallery in 1999,
Christophe Van de Weghe worked as Gagosian Gallery’s top director. Josh Baer, Art by Numbers:
Printing Money, N.Y. Mag. (Dec. 18, 2000), http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/features/4201. An online
digital media company’s website lists dinner parties that Alberto Mugrabi and Peter Brant have hosted
together and displays several pictures of them side-by-side. See, e.g., Aby Rosen, Peter Brant &
Alberto
Mugrabi
Dinner
at
W
South
Beach,
PatrickMcMullan.com,
http://www.patrickmcmullan.com/site/
event_detail.aspx?eid=31615 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). Brant also personally interviewed dealer and
gallery owner Larry Gagosian for one of Brant’s publications, Interview Magazine, in 2012. Peter
Brant, Larry Gagosian, Interview Mag., Dec. 2012/Jan. 2013, at 140. While Peter Brant does not
appear in the auction records analyzed to produce Figures 1 and 2, arts journalist Sarah Thornton calls
Brant’s “the best [Warhol] collection.” Thornton, supra note 64, at 29; see also Wolff, supra note 55,
at 64.
133. Carol Vogel, Art Dealer and 3 Others Sued Over $26.5 Million in Taxes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
2003, at C12.
134. Artelligence Panel, supra note 25; Marion Maneker, Art Market Shifts with Players, N.Y.
Sun, Apr. 10, 2007, at 1 (stating that Alberto Mugrabi got into a bidding war with collector Peter
Brant and quoting Alberto Mugrabi saying, “I’m only helping my collection . . . [i]f I don’t get it, I’m
keeping the market healthy. Everyone likes a healthy market.”)
135. See supra Figure 1.
136. Wolff, supra note 55, at 64.
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group could manipulate the Warhol market to maintain or increase the
value of their holdings, while sometimes remaining unidentified.

3.

Additional Opportunities for Collusion

The lack of clarity in the overall market creates further
opportunities for collusion. Data available to sellers, buyers, and the
public is limited, even at auction. Thus the market is hard to understand,
even for those that deal within it. It is likely even more difficult for a
regulatory body outside of the art industry to identify price-fixing
practices. Further, unlike the gasoline in Socony-Vacuum, art has an
inherently subjective value.137 Even if parties in the art industry were to
conspire, they could easily explain a sudden upsurge in pricing caused by
a price fixing agreement by pointing to an upsurge in a work’s aesthetic
desirability. Finally, the art market is highly unregulated, again leading to
the ability to manipulate prices while going unnoticed by those outside of
the market. The combination of these factors makes the Warhol market
ripe for price fixing.
Given the small group of market players with existing relationships
and a strong common interest in keeping Warhol prices high, the
possibility of collusion is hardly a surprise or secret. Adam Lindemann,
an art collector and writer referred to these parties as a “crooked cartel”
whose “scam” he is “in on.”138 He wrote the comment in response to an
article by fellow writer Sarah Thornton, which referenced parties such as
“[t]ightknit cabals of dealers and speculative collectors.”139

III. Balancing Antitrust Goals with Privacy Concerns
The goal of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers. The art
market’s opacity creates opportunities for collusive price fixing, which
inherently harms consumers with higher prices and barriers to entering
the market. Thus, increasing transparency is essential to protecting
consumers in this market. However, as many buyers and sellers at
auction prefer to remain anonymous, any solution to this issue must
balance antitrust goals with privacy concerns. This Part proposes one
solution that takes into account both of these considerations.
A. Sherman Act Goals and Antitrust Concerns
The Sherman Act’s goal is to “increase efficiency and productivity
to the ultimate benefit of the consumer in the form of lower prices, better
137. See supra Part I.A.
138. See, e.g., Adam Lindemann, Writing About Not Writing About the Art Market,
AdamLindemann.com (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.adamlindemann.com/writing-about-the-art-market.
139. Sarah Thornton, Top 10 Reasons NOT to Write About the Art Market, TAR Mag., Fall 2012, at 82,
82.
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products, and increased value.”140 In Socony-Vacuum, market
manipulation trickled down to the numerous consumers that purchased
gasoline.141 Given the importance of the gasoline market, the DOJ
prosecuted the Socony-Vacuum case to protect those consumers.
Some are skeptical of the need to protect the “consumers” now
involved in the art market, a supposedly small group of wealthy,
sophisticated parties. For example, one popular argument for allowing
market manipulation in the secondary art market is that only the richest,
savviest buyers are harmed by its rising prices.142 Given their level of
sophistication and available capital, some argue that the affected parties
can protect themselves. Writer and collector Adam Lindemann
encapsulates this contention in stating that “innocent moms and pops
don’t buy art.”143
However, potential harm to the greater population may arise if
museums and other philanthropic organizations, where the general
public has access to see and enjoy art, are cut out of the market by rising
prices.144 Peggy Guggenheim, the benefactor of several major
eponymous art museums around the world, recounted that by the 1950s
the most notable art was being traded by investors that could afford it.145
To make matters worse, some dealers store a majority of their collections
in guarded storage facilities.146 Thus, “much of [the] collection is not in
museums or on display,” but instead completely outside of public view.147
Though this form of harm is difficult to quantify, it likely exists.
Museum acquisition policies vary. Some museums have policies against
purchasing works, and instead rely solely on gifts from collectors to build
their permanent collections.148 Museums that do purchase art have
varying acquisitions budgets.149 Despite these variations, the rising prices
mean that even museums with large budgets that do want to purchase
works, such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, do not
have the capacity to compete with some of today’s dealers and
collectors.150 This leads to a real possibility that more museums, as well
140. Deborah P. Majoras, Recognizing the Significance of Prosecutorial Discretion in a MultiLayered Antitrust Enforcement World, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 121, 122 (2002).
141. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 168–69 (1940).
142. See, e.g., Lindemann, supra note 138.
143. See id.
144. Lee Rosenbaum, So Long Masterpieces, L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 2007, at A15.
145. See Guggenheim, supra note 5, at 108.
146. See, e.g., Zeveloff, supra note 121.
147. Id.
148. Judith H. Dobrzynski, How an Acquisition Fund Burnishes Reputations, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
2012, at F4.
149. Id.
150. For example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s acquisition budget, for all departments, has
ranged from $30 million to $100 million over the past six years. Though this budget is high as
compared to those of other museums, when split between its numerous departments, it does not allow
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as other collectors with less resources, might be able to access the
secondary art market if prices were lower.
B. Privacy Concerns
Many buyers and sellers prefer to remain anonymous in buying or
selling artwork through an auction house. Sotheby’s Senior Vice
President of Provenance and Restitution Lucian Simmons described
Sotheby’s policy with respect to client confidentiality, stating:
Sotheby’s will not disclose clients’ identity without their consent as this
is commercially sensitive proprietary data of Sotheby’s and could
constitute a breach of contract and/or a breach of data protection and
privacy legislation—depending on the jurisdictions concerned. We are
equally sensitive to the privacy concerns of the heirs to looted
collections and do everything we can to help them maintain their
anonymity in the event that they wish to sell restituted property
through Sotheby’s.151

As discussed above, many buyers use phone bidding to remain
anonymous.152 A review of the May 2014 Sotheby’s Contemporary Art
Evening auction catalog, as encapsulated in Figures 3 and 4 below,
illustrates the fact that sellers also prefer to remain unidentified.153
Figure 3 shows that, of seventy-nine works sold at that auction, the
auction records for fifty-four, or 68%
, do not reference their sellers’
names.154 Forty-three, or 54%
, of the total works list no identifying
information whatsoever, using terms such as “private collection” or
“present owner.”155 The other eleven, or 14%
, of works without sellers’
names listed show only geographic identifiers, such as “Europe,” “East
Coast,” or “New York.”156 Only three sellers owning twenty-five, or 32%
,
of all works chose to be listed: the Estate of Andrew Gordon; Jane and
Marc Nathanson; and the Sender Collection.157 The Sender Collection
was featured, with nineteen works in the sale. If those works were
removed, the percentage of works without a seller identified would jump
90%
, as shown in Figure 4. Thus, most sellers in that sale, as in many

for
expansive
purchasing.
See
Annual
Report,
Metro.
Museum
of
Art,
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/annual-reports/reports (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
151. Lucian Simmons, Provenance and Private Ownership: Just and Fair Solutions in the
Commercial Art Market 6 (2009), available at http://www.commartrecovery.org/sites/default/files/
docs/events/LucianSimmonsPaperforPrague.pdf.
152. See supra Parts I.D, II.C.2.
153. See generally Ahead of the Curve: The Sender Collection, Sotheby’s,
http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2014/contemporary-art-evening-salen09141/lot.2.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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others at Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and Phillips’s evening sales, preferred to
remain anonymous.

Figure 3: Sotheby’s May 13, 2014 Contemporary Art
Evening Auction

Figure 4: Sotheby’s May 13, 2014 Contemporary Art
Evening Auction Without Sender Collection

C. Proposing a Solution to Balance These Concerns and
Discourage Collusion
Implementing a mechanism to increase pricing transparency in the
art market could minimize opportunities for collusion and enable
purchasers on the secondary market to make more informed decisions
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when purchasing in the secondary market. As previously discussed, the
disparity between the publicity of the auction market and the opacity of
the remainder of the market creates opportunities for price fixing or
other forms of anticompetitive collusive conduct.
One way to implement a mechanism would be through government
action. The DOJ or the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) could
investigate the structure and function of the auction market to determine
if participants in the market are in fact engaging in collusion. In such a
case, the government could reach an “antitrust consent decree” with
auction houses to curtail these opportunities. An antitrust consent decree
is “an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the Attorney
General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct challenged by
the Attorney General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, or related statutes.”158 Parties to a consent decree:
[W]aive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus
save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in
exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each
give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the
litigation.159

Consent decrees may also be reached prospectively, outside of the
litigation context. For example, the DOJ and FTC have propagated a
preventative “fix it first” policy with respect to mergers, where they
reach consent decrees when companies are in the process of merging,
before possible antitrust violations occur.160
Another solution would be for auction houses to implement changes
unilaterally, serving the interests of the art market as well as protecting
consumers from collusion. For example, Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and
Phillips could create a mechanism that increases consumer awareness of
interested parties’ bidding activities, without sacrificing privacy concerns.
The system would work as follows. First, the auction house would
require that all buyers wishing to participate at an evening auction
(“Participants”)161 report to the auction house the percentage of works in
the Participants’ art collections created by each artist featured in that
auction. Second, the auction houses could establish a formula, based on
benchmarks they determine, to identify bidders who may have incentives

158. Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Rep. on Consent
Decree Program of the Department of Justice (Comm. Print 1959).
159. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
160. 2 Spencer Weber Waller & Andre Fiebig, Antitrust and American Business Abroad
§ 13:8 (3d ed. 2013); Panel, 60 Minutes with J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, 54 Antitrust L.J. 131, 143 (1985).
161. Auction houses could eventually include auctions other than evening sales. However, given the
value and limited number of works sold at evening sales, they would be the most reasonable place to start.
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and opportunities to collude.162 If a Participant meets the threshold
formula, the Participant would be deemed an “Interested Bidder.” Third,
during the auction, the auction house would track instances where an
Interested Bidder placed a bid. The auction house could then convey, in
its post-sale records, the bid prices submitted by all Interested Bidders
without disclosing any personal information. For example, a record with
two Interested Bidders and one non-Interested Bidder buying an
artwork by Banksy titled “Dogs” would include the following text:
NB (non-Interested Bidder): $1 million
IB1 (Interested Bidder 1): $1.25 million
IB2 (Interested Bidder 2): $1.5 million

Through this structure, buyers would retain their privacy and the
market would be more transparent. Consumers would be better
equipped to know when prices in the primary market had been driven
higher by actions of Interested Bidders and could use such information
to aid in their negotiations for artworks outside of the auction market.
For example, a seller negotiating the price of a work comparable to
Banksy’s “Dogs” referenced above might tell a buyer that the market
value of the artwork was $1.5 million. The buyer could counter that the
work might not actually be worth $1.5 million, given that Interested
Bidders placed many of the final bids at auction. Of course, the seller
would have the ability to refuse to sell the work at a lower price. But at
least, with this added level of transparency, a prospective post-auction
buyer would find herself on a more level playing ground with the seller.

Conclusion
The current art market’s structure is similar to the environment
leading to Socony-Vacuum, and is, in some ways, more conducive to
collusive price fixing. In Socony-Vacuum, major oil companies took
advantage of spot markets and formed price-fixing agreements to
increase their own contract gasoline prices. They limited supply on spot
markets, which were used to determine more common, but unpublished,
contract pricing. Similarly, the current art market is generally opaque,
but features its own smaller public auction market. Three other aspects
of the art market not present in Socony-Vacuum make the art market
further disposed to collusive price fixing: (1) the subjective value of art;

162. This formula could be similar to that currently used in the securities market. See, e.g., Form
13F—Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm.,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). I merely offer a proposal and
admit that any calculation of Interested Buyers would need to take into consideration issues with title,
for example, in the case where a buyer transfers half of her collection to a trust or holding company,
and neither she nor the holding company would qualify as an interested party (despite the fact that she
controls a five percent market dominant position).
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(2) the conflicts of interest present when dealer/sellers double as
advisors; and (3) phone bidding, which allows parties to bid while
remaining anonymous. Accordingly, the art market’s structure creates
greater opportunities and incentives for art dealers to manipulate the
overall art market by buying and underbidding blue-chip works at
auction. By implementing mechanisms to increase transparency in this
market, regulatory bodies and major auction houses could curtail those
opportunities and incentives to prevent collusion.

